An Overview of Helen Longino's Paper "Values and Objectivity"

In her 1990 paper “Values and Objectivity” Helen Longino investigates varying approaches to objectivity in science and presents her own reasons for thinking why science is objective. She initially describes the current problems with the varying definitions of objectivity in science by analysing the Positivists and Traditional Empiricists approach to objectivity. She moves on to then show how she believes that objectivity in science is secure due to the nature of the social structures that encompass science. She argues that individual scientist’s values are justified and accounted for in her contextualist account of objectivity, and it is in fact these varying values within a community that ultimately result in objectivity.

The Positivist’s proposal for objectivity in science relies on an arbitrary/biased ‘context of discovery’ and a logical ‘context of justification’. This ‘context of discovery’ refers to the subjective nature of the circumstances surrounding the initial formulation of the hypothesis, and accounts for the varying mental and emotional states of the individual scientist. The subjective nature of the origin of hypothesis is negated by what Positivists call the ‘context of justification’ where theories are investigated in an empirical manor, considering only its observable consequences when determining its acceptability. This approach allows the acknowledgment of the subjective origin of hypothesis but retains the objectivity of science.

Traditional Empiricists such as Thomas Kuhn feel that this account of objectivity is historically unsatisfactory and so have proposed an account that seems more historically accurate. Kuhn proposes that science is based around paradigms, that a way of thinking about certain fields is developed (a paradigm) and is followed and taught for a period until anomalies arise and a paradigm shift eventually occurs. This, Kuhn argues, accounts for periods such as where the heliocentric model of the universe was accepted until a paradigm shift occurred and that model was replaced with the heliocentric model of the universe. This approach does not speak for the objectivity of science though, objectivity would only be in context to the paradigm currently being asserted by scientific community.

Longino feels that neither of these proposals are satisfactory, “a logically analysis that is historically unsatisfactory and a historically analysis that is logically unsatisfactory”, and so decides to take another approach to objectivity in science.

An important distinction to make of science is that it is not simply a body of knowledge, but instead the practice and methodology of how that knowledge is gained. So when discussing the subjective or objective nature of science, we are really discussing whether the practise of science, or more correctly the scientific method, is objective or not. We are to presume that if we were able to form a completely objective scientific method, then the knowledge gained from such methodology would be equally objective, as the knowledge would have been independent of any personal bias.

Longino suggests that by defining science as a practice we can now show that it is not something that is practised by an individual but instead by social groups. This social nature of science is emphasized by Marjorie Grene , where she speaks of scientists’ reliance on others for their education, ideas and instruments. With the rapid expansion in the wealth of our knowledge it is almost a necessity to have several different scientists with varying expertise working together on a project. Longino calls this “‘big science’ ;(where) a single complex experiment may be broken into parts, each of which will be charged to a different individual or group of individuals” .

Longino argues that while it may still be shown that the individuals are in at least principle practising science, scientific knowledge is gained not just by collecting all the data into one whole, but by the critical evaluation and modification of that data by the scientific community. This “critical emendation and modification” of an individual’s data by the society is what Longino believes ensures that science is still objective. Processes such as peer-review analyse papers to ensure that they are methodologically correct and that the data is sufficient to support the conclusions made. Further repetition of experiments once the papers are published ensure that the same results can be found in varying labs by individuals whom hold differing values to the initial investigators. Even further down the track, when hypotheses based on knowledge gained from the initial findings don’t hold true, then those original findings are often scrutinised further. This gives science its perception of being self correcting.

Longino describes how “the greater the number of different points of view included in a community, the more likely its scientific practices will be objective” . This view seems to indicate that alternative values act to ‘cancel’ each other out or suppress one another’s extremities and enough variance within a community will result in objectivity when combined with the fore mentioned critical review.
Longino continues on to provide a list criteria that must be met to achieve objectivity in the sense she describes. Firstly there must be “recognised avenues for criticism”. This would include processes such as ‘peer-review’ where reviewers are able to assess whether the claims made by a paper are substantiated by the evidence it provides. Longino also suggests that more emphasis should be put on critical review, so that scientists are encouraged to critically evaluate others work instead of only doing ‘original’ research.

Secondly standards must be set up that critics can invoke. These standards would not provide a ‘theory’ of theory choice as others have suggested and Longino admits that they would need more precise formulation but would include empirical adequacy and truth.
Thirdly the scientific community must respond to the critical discussions taking place. The content of textbooks and other sources of knowledge must be continually updated to take into account any criticism.
Lastly “intellectual authority” must be shared to prevent certain assumptions dominating communities due to the ideals of those in power. An example of this would be the German genetics program which was dominated by ideals of Eugenics during the 20th century due to the Naze parties interest in the field.

A point of contention with Longino’s account of objectivity is actually provided by her, as she describes that the belief we can just read data is a recipe for replicating mainstream values and ideology . As shown, Longino accepts that individuals cannot escape the confines of subjectivity and are inevitability going to impose their personal bias on events. But what is it that makes a community so immune to such a bias? Why is the chosen criticism of someone’s hypothesis not biased in itself. She claims that the combined critical review of others’ work by a community will negate any such bias, but in doing so she is stating that objectivity is decided by agreement rather than actual truth. Knowledge is unquestionably benefited by the contributions of a society, but can critical consensus be the standard for objectivity?

Another problem with such an account is that Longino is vague on outlining what level of criticism is needed before a hypothesis is recognised as objective. Is it that there exists a magic point where a theory has been criticised enough and subjected to enough varying values that it is suddenly objective? Or is it that the scientific method is objective as long it continues to criticise and include varying values? If this was the case then Longino would have created a contradiction with her original assumption that objective methodology leads to objective knowledge, as any of the knowledge gained could never be called objective because it could still be criticised further in the future.

Helen Longino presents an account of science as objective due to the social nature of the scientific method. Her account does succeed where she perceives others as having failed, in that it is both logically and historically satisfactory but is not without flaws of its own.